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Irrationality and “Gut” 
Reasoning
Two Kinds of Truthiness
Amber L. Griffioen
I love the truth—it’s facts I’m not a fan of.
Stephen Colbert of The Colbert Report
You might wonder what an article about The Colbert Report is doing 
in a book about The Daily Show. Well, Stephen was a Daily Show 
correspondent for eight years (1997–2005), and he has since collabo-
rated extensively with Jon Stewart, despite the immense success of his 
own show. Just consider the Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear in 
2010 and Colbert’s handing over his Super PAC to Stewart in 2012. 
Both are examples of continued collaboration (though in the latter 
case not coordination!) between The Daily Show and The Colbert 
Report. Furthermore, given Jon Stewart’s continued criticism of the 
inconsistency and irrationality of the American media, the notion of 
truthiness has relevance for any fan of The Daily Show.
A Little Background
On the very first episode of The Colbert Report, Stephen Colbert 
boldly introduced the word “truthiness”1 into the American 
vocabulary:
Chapter 21
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I will speak to you in plain, simple English. And that brings us to tonight’s 
word: “truthiness.” Now I’m sure some of the “word police,” the “word-
inistas” over at Webster’s, are gonna say, “Hey, that’s not a word!” Well, 
anyone who knows me knows I’m no fan of dictionaries or reference 
books. They’re elitist—constantly telling us what is or isn’t true …
I don’t trust books. They’re all fact, no heart. And that’s exactly what’s 
pulling our country apart today. ’Cause face it, folks: we are a divided 
nation. Not between Democrats and Republicans, or conservatives and 
liberals, or tops and bottoms. No, we are divided between those who 
think with their head, and those who know with their heart.
Colbert went on to give the audience a few examples:
If you think about Harriet Miers, of course her nomination is absurd. 
But the President didn’t say he thought about her selection. He said this:
[Clip of President Bush]: “I know her heart.”
Notice how he said nothing about her brain? He didn’t have to. He 
feels the truth about Harriet Miers.
And what about Iraq? If you think about it, maybe there are a few 
missing pieces to the rationale for war, but doesn’t taking Saddam out 
feel like the right thing … right here [pointing to stomach]—right here 
in the gut? (October 17, 2005)
In more recent broadcasts, Colbert has made such claims during his 
interviews as, “Science can be a personal choice,” (April 23, 2012) and 
“I make gut judgments about people. Then later I figure out a mental 
justification for that gut judgment.” (May 2, 2012). There are, then, 
two closely related notions of “truthiness” implied in these clips: (1) 
the sense in which one “chooses” to believe something based on what 
one prefers to be the case, as opposed to responding to the facts of the 
matter, and (2) the sense in which one appeals to an intuition (or a gut 
feeling) to provide justification for a belief.
The American Dialect Society, which named “truthiness” its 2005 
Word of the Year, officially defined it as “the quality of preferring con-
cepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts 
known to be true.”2 Of course, “preferring” something one wishes to 
be true over something “known” to be true does not necessarily mean 
one chooses to believe it, as we stated in (1) above. I will return to this 
a bit later. Nevertheless, the ADS’s definition looks a lot like many of 
the phenomena we philosophers classify under the category of 
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 motivated epistemic3 irrationality. Loosely speaking, we are talking 
about cases of someone’s believing something for “bad” reasons simply 
because one has a personal motivation to do so. Maybe I wishfully 
believe that I am a good driver (despite having been in several fender-
benders) because I don’t want to admit to myself and others that I 
really am a bad driver. Or perhaps my desire to be a competent teacher 
leads me to unreasonably think that my students understand the 
incredibly complicated argument I just presented to them. Or maybe 
my admiration for Barack Obama causes me to overlook certain 
 morally relevant failures of his administration that I would have no 
problem criticizing the Bush Administration for.4 In all these cases, 
something I care about (for example, my self-image or my respect for 
another person) motivates me to believe something not supported by 
the objective facts of the matter. That is, truthy beliefs in this first sense 
seem to be beliefs that it is epistemically unreasonable to believe. But 
is it really always bad to believe “unreasonably” in this way? After all, 
the word “reason” is “just one letter away from ‘treason’!” (September 
16, 2010). What’s so bad about believing from the gut? This leads us 
to the second definition of “truthiness” discussed above.
When Merriam-Webster voted “truthiness” its 2006 Word of the 
Year, it defined the term as “truth that comes from the gut, not 
books.”5 In this sense, then, truthiness amounts to intuiting the truth 
via some “gut” feeling: “Because that’s where the truth comes from, 
ladies and gentlemen … the gut.”6 We may find this notion laughable 
(or at least laugh-worthy), but we do frequently appeal to feelings or 
intuitions, often in ways we take to be perfectly legitimate. “Something 
doesn’t feel right,” we say, or “this action just seems like the wrong 
thing to do.” Indeed, our frequent references to phenomena like 
“common sense,” “women’s intuition,” “rubbing someone the wrong 
way,” and so on seem to indicate that we do sometimes appeal to this 
kind of truthiness to justify certain truth claims or actions. So perhaps 
“truthy” appeals to the gut aren’t as irrational as we might have first 
thought.
In what follows, I want to look a little bit more closely at these two 
notions of truthiness. Focusing on the first sense, I will draw some 
parallels between truthiness and paradigm cases of motivated epi-
stemic irrationality like wishful thinking and self-deception. I will 
then turn to the second sense to see if relying on our guts in the way 
Colbert suggests might sometimes be rational.
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Truthiness and Problems of Irrationality
There are three basic types of cases that philosophers traditionally 
classify under the term “irrationality.”7 The first two cases, wishful 
thinking and self-deception, have to do with a person believing in an 
irrational manner and thus fall under the umbrella of epistemic irra-
tionality. The third case, weakness of will, is a matter of so-called 
practical irrationality and involves a person undertaking a certain 
action, despite taking herself to have a better reason (all things con-
sidered) not to do so. While I think that truthiness might be able to fit 
the mold of each of these three kinds of irrationality, it applies most 
directly to cases of wishful thinking and self-deception—and it’s these 
two types of irrationality that I wish to discuss extensively in the next 
section. As we will see, there are some troubling philosophical prob-
lems that arise regarding irrational behavior (especially self- deception). 
But perhaps we can use the context of truthiness to help us resolve 
these “paradoxes of irrationality” without denying the fundamental 
irrationality of truthiness itself.
Wishful Thinking and Self-Deception:  
What Are They?
Wishful thinking and self-deception are two very closely related but 
nonetheless distinct kinds of irrational belief-forming processes. 
Wishful thinking occurs when someone has a strong desire that 
something (call it “X”) be true and comes to believe X primarily 
because of that strong desire, but not for any “good” reason that takes 
the facts of the situation into account. Thus, wishful thinking does not 
require that the person knows the relevant facts of the situation, but 
merely that she comes to believe X primarily because she really wants 
to. Self-deception, on the other hand, seems to occur when someone 
comes to hold a belief in the face of strong evidence to the contrary.8 
In this latter case the person is in some sense aware of what she herself 
takes to be the relevant facts (which presumably fly in the face of X), 
but refuses to acknowledge them because she so strongly desires to 
believe X. Self-deception, then, appears to be much closer to “choos-
ing to believe” something than wishful thinking. In both cases, how-
ever, the subject has a strong desire that X be true—and it is this desire 
 IRRATIONALITY AND “GUT” REASONING 313
that motivates affirmation of something not borne out by the fact. 
The difference lies in the level of awareness the subject has of the 
counter-evidence and how seriously she takes this awareness.
Let’s look at an example to help illustrate this difference. Suppose 
senior Daily Show correspondent Samantha Bee very badly wants her 
husband and fellow Daily Show correspondent, Jason Jones, to be 
faithful to her. We can imagine that this desire itself might be strong 
enough to cause her to believe in his fidelity without ever really 
looking at whether the facts support this.9 In this case, Sam would just 
be a wishful thinker. However, suppose the relevant facts available to 
her do indicate that he is cheating. Maybe he continually comes home 
late at night with lipstick on his collar, smelling of cheap perfume, and 
making lame excuses. Perhaps Sam’s good friend, Wyatt, even tells her 
that he has witnessed Jason cavorting around with a younger woman 
on the set of The Daily Show. If she then continues to believe in his 
fidelity, despite being aware of this counter-evidence, then we might 
think that Sam has gone beyond mere wishful thinking and entered 
the realm of self-deception.
It is not difficult to see how appeals to truthiness might sometimes 
underlie both of these types of irrationality. Remember Colbert’s 
asser tion that the President doesn’t need to make reference to Harriet 
Miers’ brain or qualifications because he just “feels the truth” about 
her? The wife engaged in wishful thinking may say similar things 
with out even bothering to see if the facts line up with her belief: 
“I don’t need to look at the facts,” she might say. “I love my husband, 
and I just know he would never cheat on me,” or, “I can feel in my 
heart that he is faithful.” And if she stubbornly continues to affirm 
this belief (both to herself and to others) in the face of strong evidence 
to the contrary—relying on her supposed “gut feeling” that he is 
 faithful—this “truthy” behavior would likely count as something 
stronger than mere wishful thinking—something like self-deception.
The Paradoxes of Irrationality
Cases like the one above are all too common in our everyday lives. 
However, it is surprising how difficult it is to provide a philosophical 
account of how we are actually able to believe in such ways, at least 
as far as self-deception is concerned. Wishful thinking doesn’t seem all 
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that mysterious. Given the way we human beings are cognitively built, 
it turns out that we often simply find ourselves believing things we 
want to be true and doubting things we don’t want to be true.10 We 
tend to think that we are more intelligent, more attractive, better 
drivers, better people than we actually are. Similarly, we are more wil-
ling to give people we love (including ourselves) the “benefit of the 
doubt”—precisely because we care about them. And this is not neces-
sarily a bad thing, even if it turns out to be epistemically irrational.
People who believe things wishfully are irrational in some sense, 
since they’re not being sensitive to the evidence. But they still somehow 
seem “more rational” than their self-deceiving counterparts. Most 
wishful thinkers don’t usually realize they are believing wishfully 
while they’re in the grip of wishful thinking. Indeed, insofar as they 
are still rational, we would expect them to be willing to revise their 
wishful beliefs if they find out (or even suspect) that they are believing 
wishfully—or at least to check to see whether the facts back up their 
beliefs. If, on the other hand, they persist in holding onto their false 
beliefs—if they continue to believe in the face of counter-evidence 
that  they recognize as counter-evidence—then they seem to be self-
deceived, which implies being irrational in a stronger sense, and this 
is a little trickier to explain.
The difficulty in making sense of self-deception can be made clear 
by comparing it with its counterpart in the interpersonal realm, 
namely the deception of other people. Other-deception is relatively 
straightforward. Suppose Steve Carell wants to deceive Jon Stewart 
that he’s coming back to The Daily Show. That is, Steve holds a certain 
belief “X” (that he intends to return to The Daily Show) to be false 
(he has no such intention). In other words, he believes “not-X” (that 
he is not returning11). Steve then tries to persuade Jon that X is true. 
If Jon, through Steve’s efforts, does come to believe X, then Steve has 
successfully deceived Jon about X.
However, in the case of self-deception, one and the same individual 
is supposed to play the role of both deceiver and deceived. The 
individual engaged in self-deception tries, through her own efforts, to 
become deceived about some fact she does not want to admit. But, 
unlike the interpersonal case, it is unclear how she could ever succeed. 
If Jon knows what Steve is up to, he is unlikely to be duped (unless, of 
course, he is incredibly stupid). But if the self-deceiver is aware of her 
own intent to deceive herself, then it seems like she could never achieve 
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her goal! That is, awareness of her intention threatens to undermine 
the success of her self-deception altogether.12 Furthermore, it seems 
that if an agent could succeed in deceiving herself, then she must 
somehow knowingly hold both the belief that not-X (in her role as the 
deceiver) and the belief that X (in her role as the one deceived) at the 
same time.13 Hence, we seem to embroil ourselves in two paradoxes 
when we attempt to explain how self-deception works—and cases of 
self-deceptive truthiness will be no different.
So how is self-deception even possible? How can truthiness in this 
stronger sense even get off the ground? The above paradoxes are quite 
troubling, and for this reason some philosophers try to explain self- 
deception away entirely, and say that it’s not at all like interpersonal 
deception. They say self-deception is really just a person’s being either 
in error (for example, about the facts or about the way she formed her 
belief) or controlled by some external psychological force.14 But we 
don’t usually think that self-deceivers are merely making a motivated 
mistake. Self-deceivers not only ought to know better; we think they 
actually do know better in some sense.15 Likewise, we think that there 
is some relevant difference between the self-deceiver and the person 
who believes things pathologically (as with, say, obsessive-compulsive 
or delusional beliefs). Compulsive believers might actually know 
better, but they can’t help believing as they do. So if we think self-
deceivers might be responsible for their deceptions, then they must at 
least be capable of revising their beliefs. Thus, we must try to face the 
paradoxes head-on and see if we can construct a view of self- deception 
that will allow us not only to understand how self-deceptive truthi-
ness is possible but also to keep a strong notion of the irrationality of 
self-deception intact. But what might such an account of self- deception 
look like?
One Solution: Divide the Mind
One way that philosophers have attempted to resolve the paradoxes 
mentioned above is simply to divide the mind into independent struc-
tures that can deceive each other like one person deceives another. 
Perhaps, like famed psychologist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), we 
can simply postulate that there is some sort of subconscious mind 
that acts to deceive my conscious mind.16 (Imagine Steve Carell and 
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Jon Stewart in our above example occupying the space of just one 
person! Or just think of Stephen Colbert versus Stephen Colbert in 
The Colbert Report’s regular “Formidable Opponent” segment.) Of 
course, on the Freudian picture, we have two independent sub-agents 
(think: “mini-persons”), who “team up,” so to speak, to deceive the 
ego. Let’s go back to our example of Sam and Jason. Suppose Sam 
wants it to be the case that Jason is a faithful husband. She very likely 
believes that he ought not be cheating on her. Perhaps she also believes 
it would be inappropriate to accuse her husband of infidelity. Now 
imagine that “deep down” in her subconscious Sam believes that 
Jason is likely cheating on her. However, her subconscious tricks her 
conscious mind into thinking he is actually faithful! And since she is 
unconscious of her belief that Jason is unfaithful (and perhaps also of 
her strong desire to believe in his fidelity), she is easily duped by her 
subconscious into believing that Jason is faithful. In this way, we don’t 
have to worry about the static paradox, since although Sam-as-a-
whole believes both X and not-X at the same time, one belief is on the 
level of the conscious mind, the other on that of the unconscious. 
Likewise, since the subconscious and conscious parts of the mind act 
independently, we don’t have to worry about the dynamic paradox 
either. So far, so good.
But there are some significant problems with this view.17 This first 
is that we suddenly have a problem locating the person herself (here, 
Samantha Bee). It looks as if each mental substructure has person-like 
qualities. Each part can weigh possibilities, have beliefs and desires, 
interact with and independently act on other parts of the mind, and so 
on. If this is the case, and the interaction between the parts of the 
mind works like interpersonal interaction, it appears that we have 
multiple agents instead of just one!18 Who is the adjudicator on this 
view? Where is Sam the person? If we want to be able to hold Sam 
responsible for her self-deception, who should we blame? Is it her 
conscious mind’s fault that it got hoodwinked? (Think about the 
example of interpersonal deception: We wouldn’t normally hold Jon 
responsible for believing Steve’s lie, would we?) But if we instead 
blame Sam’s unconscious, are we really blaming Sam? What would it 
mean to blame just her unconscious? Could we even find it?
This leads to a further concern. On the kind of view sketched above, 
we have a really hard time explaining why Sam’s belief that Jason is 
likely cheating on her is unconscious in the first place. If she never 
 IRRATIONALITY AND “GUT” REASONING 317
consciously acknowledged that the evidence strongly supports the 
belief that he’s cheating, then it seems rather mysterious as to how this 
belief just “ended up” in her subconscious. Instead, one is more likely 
to claim that Sam does at some point consciously acknowledge that 
the evidence supports the belief that Jason is unfaithful, and then she 
represses this information. She pushes it deep down into her subcon-
scious where it becomes free to do its deceptive work. But now it 
looks like her conscious mind is doing all the heavy self-deceptive 
lifting, not her subconscious. To keep out the undesirable belief, the 
conscious mind has to somehow actively “push it down” into the sub-
conscious. And here the dynamic paradox reemerges. How can Sam 
successfully repress undesirable information if she knows what she’s 
up to? Maybe the subconscious mind has certain defense mechanisms 
that “kick in” when threatening information comes into conscious-
ness and automatically relegate that information to the unconscious. 
Yet then we have the worry that Sam’s self-deception is something 
largely out of her control—the result of a compulsive defense mecha-
nism, as it were. But it was precisely this view that we wanted to 
avoid. Thus, in the end, divided mind views seem to create more prob-
lems than they solve. So how can we understand self-deception 
without literally dividing the mind?
An Alternative Account
There is another way we can account for self-deception that might be 
less problematic. First, instead of viewing self-deception as a state, 
achieved when one somehow causes oneself to hold contradictory 
beliefs, I think we would do better to approach it as a process, a sort 
of “project,” in which an agent actively engages. And I think we can 
explain this process without having to refer to unconscious sub-agents 
within the person. Now generally when a rational person holds a 
belief, and she recognizes that the evidence to the contrary greatly 
outweighs the evidence in support of her belief, she will revise her 
belief accordingly. However, in cases of self-deception, this does not 
occur because the agent has a strong motivation to retain her (unwar-
ranted) belief. Instead, she commits herself to maintaining her belief 
in the face of the evidence, likely employing several strategies to do 
so.  Of course, she doesn’t have to ever commit herself explicitly. 
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My point is merely that the way she behaves indicates her having such 
a practical commitment.
Let’s return once again to our example of Sam and Jason to see how 
this might work. On my account of self-deception, Sam is aware that 
the facts support the belief that Jason is cheating on her, and she is 
likewise aware of her desire to believe he is faithful. But she diverts 
her attention from these two facts and focuses instead on the belief 
she wishes to cultivate, namely that Jason is faithful. There are several 
techniques she can employ in the service of this project. Perhaps she 
selectively pays more attention to positive instead of negative evi-
dence. Or she avoids situations where she might encounter negative 
evidence. When Wyatt points out that Sam’s belief is unwarranted, 
Sam might rationalize in order to keep her belief intact (e.g., “Wyatt’s 
just jealous of our great relationship!”). In these ways, she can push 
all the negative evidence to the “margins” of her awareness by ignoring 
criticism, or even stubbornly repeating to herself “He loves me” over 
and over again until she fails to be swayed by reasons to believe the 
contrary.
Note that none of this requires that her self-deceptive activity be 
on some sub-personal, unconscious level. Rather, we should merely 
see Sam’s activity as a kind of active attention-directing, which is 
something we do all the time, without thereby becoming completely 
unaware of the former object of our attention. Surely Jon Stewart can 
turn to Camera 3 and yet still be aware of Camera 1 (in his peripheral 
vision, say). He is not paying attention to Camera 1, yet he is still 
aware of it—and if he wants to, he can turn back to it. Similarly, one 
of the main ways the self-deceivers try to maintain their favored 
beliefs is by basically turning their attention away from the negative 
evidence and focusing instead on positive evidence—but this doesn’t 
mean the negative evidence is simply gone. It’s still available for reflec-
tion, if the agent decides to turn her attention to it. This is why self-
deceivers tend to exhibit a lot of cognitive tension—because they are 
in some respect aware of the counter-evidence that’s out there, and it’s 
hard to willfully direct one’s attention in cases where the counter-
evidence is strong.
But if this is right, what about the dynamic paradox? If the self-
deceiver is this complicit in her deceptive project, how could she ever 
convince herself, assuming she has an idea of what she’s up to? Here, 
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it’s important to note that human beings are creatures of habit, and 
even though it might be hard for Sam to ignore negative evidence at 
first, the more she engages in self-deceptive strategies, the better she is 
likely to get at maintaining her belief. Thus, although the self-deceiver 
might experience lots of cognitive tension at the outset of her self-
deceptive project, the more she habituates herself to directing her 
attention, the easier maintaining her belief will become and the less 
cognitive dissonance she will experience. And I want to claim that this 
entire process of waffling back and forth between the belief one wants 
to maintain and the force of reality is what we should refer to when 
we talk about “self-deception.” Of course, if Sam finally habituates 
herself so well and convinces herself completely that Jason is faithful, 
where nothing counts to her as evidence against this belief, then I 
would say she is no longer self-deceived but rather more like an igno-
rant or even delusional person. If this happens, she no longer “knows 
better”—that is, she now believes for what she takes to be good 
 reasons—but the process by which she arrived at this point is both 
irrational and criticizable.
On this account of self-deception, then, the entire process is 
dynamic, with the agent fluctuating back and forth between stub-
bornly affirming the desired belief and having to deal with evidence to 
the contrary. The dynamic paradox becomes a moot point, since we 
don’t have to say that Sam must succeed in truly convincing herself. 
All that matters is that she tries to undermine her rational standards 
by means of the strategies described above. And there is no static par-
adox because the she never has to simultaneously hold inconsistent 
beliefs.
Truthiness and Self-Deception
I think it is fairly obvious that the first definition we gave above of 
“truthiness” (in which one chooses to believe something based on 
what one prefers to believe, as opposed to the supposed facts) can fit 
this model of self-deception to a tee. We sometimes prefer concepts we 
wish to be true, instead of what the facts tell us, even when we’re 
aware that these facts don’t support our belief. But Colbert’s intro-
duction to truthiness does even more than this. In a way, it ups the 
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ante on self-deception, since Colbert attempts to use truthiness to 
establish the truth of truthiness!
Let’s see how this works: Someone may wish a certain fact were 
true (say, that the Panama Canal was built in 1941), but all the books 
tell us that this is false (since the Panama Canal was, “in fact,” built in 
1914). Colbert, of course, maintains that it’s his “right” to believe the 
former claim. However, as we have seen, to do so would be to embark 
on a process of self-deception, resulting in the claim that believing 
what one wants trumps believing what one is rationally required to 
believe. Yet Colbert obviously still acknowledges the importance of 
reasoning—he is, after all, making an argument and appealing 
to  reasons—so we can see that he hasn’t abandoned his commitment to 
rationality altogether. But he is struggling to use reason to make a case 
for undermining reason. This is almost “meta-self-deception,” in the 
sense that what Colbert wants to believe is that we can “know” the 
truth with our hearts or “feel” it with our guts, and that the standards 
of what normally counts as evidence for rational belief (namely, the 
facts) are not the correct standards of rationality. And how does 
he know? He checked his gut!
In a recent segment of “Who’s Honoring Me Now?” Colbert makes 
this idea very explicit. He cites a scientific study looking for evidence 
of truthiness in action. After discussing the results of the study, he 
notes: “Now my only problem … with this scientific study is that it 
was a scientific study. You see, truthiness and empirical evidence don’t 
mix.” Here, we again have reference to the above sense of truthiness, 
involving a distrust or disavowal of the facts of the matter. But Colbert 
goes on: “Folks, you can’t prove truthiness with information. You 
prove truthiness with more truthiness—a process called ‘truthinessi-
ness’.”19 This harks back to 2006 when the AP challenged Colbert’s 
claim to have coined the word himself. Colbert shot back: “The 
fact that they looked it up in [The Oxford English Dictionary] just 
shows that they don’t get the idea of truthiness at all … You don’t 
look up truthiness in a book, you look it up in your gut.”20
What’s especially funny about this move isn’t just that it’s circular 
(trying to use truthiness to validate itself). It’s also that the claim, “the 
gut is a more accurate standard for truth than facts,” is itself an 
empirical matter, one which can be settled by looking at the facts! So 
Colbert is implicitly appealing to the facts, in order to establish that 
facts are unreliable. It’s the irrationality of this (first circular, then 
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self-defeating) argument that makes us laugh. But it also raises some 
very interesting and important questions about the connection between 
rationality and irrationality.21
Feeling the Truth: Can Our Guts  
Get Us Justified Belief?
Leaving Colbert’s circular/self-defeating move aside, the question still 
remains: Can we legitimately appeal to our guts for justification? 
Indeed, we often refer to getting a “bad feeling” about a certain person 
or place; and sometimes when asked why we dislike someone, we 
respond that he or she just “rubs me the wrong way.” Likewise, phe-
nomena like “hunches” and “women’s intuition” are supposed to 
account for how some people appear to instinctively know certain 
truths. Does this mean that reference to our guts can provide us with 
good justification for truth claims?
Without going into this question in too much detail, I just wish to 
briefly discuss this second sense of “truthiness.” While it seems that 
we often legitimately appeal to gut feelings to justify certain claims or 
beliefs, I think that what we are implicitly doing is referring to other, 
more objectively relevant facts about the situation, about which we 
merely fail to be explicit.22 Take the example of a young voter who 
refuses to vote for a certain politician, merely because of her gut 
feeling. “I just don’t have a good feeling about that guy,” she might 
say. “He just rubs me the wrong way,” or even, “He creeps me out.” 
Now in some cases—as when a woman refuses a stranger’s come-on 
for precisely the same reasons—we might just accept this type of jus-
tification and move on. However, if we pressed her for more 
information (“What rubbed you the wrong way about him?”), she 
might say something about his shifty glances, his fake smile, or his 
poor choice of words. But now we have an appeal to facts about the 
situation itself, not just about someone’s gut feeling! Indeed, “truthy” 
claims like “taking Saddam out feels like the right thing to do” might 
actually serve as implicit references not just to the desire to depose 
Saddam Hussein, but also to facts about his character or past actions 
that make us feel good about removing him from power.
However, we should be careful to avoid saying that such feelings, 
by themselves, are what make a belief justified. They are merely one 
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way of being responsive to the relevant facts. But they are not always 
the best way. Indigestion ought not to serve as rational justification 
for why I didn’t vote for a certain politician, but perhaps a bad feeling 
grounded in certain “shady” behavioral cues given off by the politi-
cian in question, can.23 However, in the latter circumstance it is not 
the feeling itself that justifies my action; rather, it is the fact that such 
behavioral cues have, in the past, been exhibited by persons of less 
than reputable moral character. And this is an important distinction 
to make, since in cases such as these, my feelings don’t make a certain 
claim true or false, whereas facts about the world do appear to accom-
plish this task. Thus, when forming important beliefs like whom to 
vote for, we ought to subject our gut feelings to rigorous questioning, 
in order to see whether we can actually come up with good epistemic 
reasons to ground these feelings. Indeed, although gut feelings might 
sometimes be a way of responding to the facts, they are often unreli-
able and may often conflict with the facts. This is what motivates 
Colbert to lead “a crusade against facts”—since, according to him, 
they too often “upset the truth that’s in your gut.” 24 But in this sense 
truthiness remains epistemically suspect, unless it’s clear that one can 
appeal to legitimate reasons which appeal to the facts of the situation 
to ground one’s gut feelings.
A Tip of the Hat
In conclusion, I would like to commend Stephen Colbert for coin-
ing  a  word that captures both the essence of motivated epistemic 
 irrationality and the difficulty we have in trying to overcome it by rational 
means. Although some instances of irrational beliefs may be harmless, 
Colbert shows us the amusing—and potentially dangerous— consequences 
of forming opinions and making decisions by going “straight from the 
gut.” In fact, I propose that from now on we call claims that appeal solely 
to the gut instances of “the fallacy of argumentum Colberti ad ventrem.”25 
The inclusion of this fallacy among other, better-known informal fallacies 
(like the argumentum ad  hominem or, my personal favorite, the argu-
mentum ad baculum) would be a welcome addition to logic textbooks 
everywhere, which often ignore the kind of fallacious reasoning involved 
in appealing to one’s gut when attempting to make cogent arguments. 
To further ignore a phenomenon that both reflects what human beings 
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often do and exposes certain irrational tendencies in human reasoning 
would be to do a disservice to philosophy.
And that’s the truthiness.
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